Slovakia: Ready for the future?

Slovak society is currently facing the same problem it has faced for a century and a half – that of not being at the same level of development as other western societies. Slovak development can best be understood as “modernization”: as the process of confronting the cultural, political, economic and technical innovations originating in western Europe; of taking over and adapting western European models to fit Slovak society; of catching up and drawing level with western European societies. This is not to say that it has been a “passive modernization”. Slovak political elites have actively attempted to be the agents of modernization from the beginning: they have made choices and searched for ways to expedite the process. The Slovak historical path therefore has its own logic, its own dynamic.

However, Slovak society shows relatively low levels of civilizational and cultural auto-centredness. (None of European societies are auto-centred: Europeanness has always meant the ability to adopt things.) We often encounter depictions of relatively auto-centred and “specific” moments in the Slovak political and cultural life as the subject of “foreign manipulation”, the result of “instrumentalization” by wider European historical processes. This relatively low level of auto-centredness has been caused not only by the low economic and demographic potential of Slovak society, but also by the fact that catching up has meant struggling to belong to the European family of nations, for “recognition” by the more powerful. Moreover, at the beginning, the “struggle for recognition” was reduced to the “struggle for attention” from the decision-making bodies of European politics.

The differences between individual groupings within the Slovak political elite have to a large degree been tied to different ideas about where exactly the “centre of the world” is, and through which capital city the path to the “real present day” leads. The argument about what Europe really is and how to get there has been around since the Enlightenment. It surfaced fully into reflexive consciousness in the last third of the nineteenth century. Three choices were available for the Slovak politicians in the mid-nineteenth century: Budapest, Vienna and St Petersburg. At the end of the nineteenth century, Slovak political leaders set their sights on Prague. Nationalist rightwing groups were torn between Rome and Berlin. Communists elected Moscow. Even today, we are debating whether Brussels is more important than Washington and vice versa. One must not forget that when decisions were made, the choices of the Slovak political elites were limited by the geopolitical configuration beyond their control.

Old problem, new solutions

What is the state of the Slovak society today? To what extent has it been able to cash in on opportunities offered by the historical process of the last decades? How did it deal with obstacles along the way? Discussions of the state of the Slovak society have provided many answers to these questions. Two, however, are more prominent than others: one extremely optimistic and one extremely pessimistic.

Let us first look at how an optimist views the state of Slovak society. He or she might reckon that Slovak society is not one from which decisive historical initiatives have originated; that it is a society that has reacted to opportunities rather than one that has actively set the direction for its own development. According to an optimist, Slovak society belongs to the more successful societies in Europe. A comparison with the status of Slovak society in every decade since the beginning of the twentieth century suffices to prove this. At the turn of the twentieth century, Slovak society was really just an “imagined community”, an ethnic community without political institutions and no realistic hope of emerging as a distinct political power to challenge Magyar Hungary, the political unit that shaped the basic framework of Slovak society until 1918. However even at that time, Slovak society was not static, passive or indifferent. There have been communities of initiative at every historical turning point, which were able to exploit opportunities for development, often at the last possible moment.

Despite all the obstacles, then, Slovak society has been able since the second half of the nineteenth century to catch onto decisive historical trends and – one way or another – to turn the opportunities offered by changes in historical configurations to its own benefit. The potential of Slovak society demonstrated itself after 1918 when Slovakia became a part of Czechoslovakia. Slovak society quickly matured politically, differentiating, reacting to current trends, and going through ups and downs like all other societies in central Europe. The era of repressive socialism had an equivalent impact on Slovakia as on other central European societies. Even if Slovakia became an industrial and urbanized society at this time, the forceful repression of civil society weakened political consciousness and depleted the awareness of opportunities for development.

After the historical turning point in 1989, Slovak society found itself in an exceptionally favourable historical configuration. Slovakia became an independent state in 1993. The reasons for the break up of Czechoslovakia are discussed to this day, and still polarize Slovak society, if only covertly. After achieving independence, development was more complicated than in neighbouring countries: the transformation of the political and economic systems, together with newly established statehood, led to swings that threatened Slovakia’s ability to keep up with the trends of European integration. After the parliamentary elections of 1998, the integration process sped up, enabling Slovakia to become a member of Nato and the EU in 2004. In January 2009, it also joined the Eurozone. Slovakia has thus achieved more than any patriot could imagine prior to 1989.

An optimist can also look into the future with hope. Nothing seems to indicate an upcoming historical rupture similar to those that in the twentieth century came every twenty years or so, accompanied by significant losses of social and cultural capital. Slovak society faces a unique opportunity for continuous development, in which it can show off its qualities. The optimist believes that it will do so.

Let us now turn to the pessimist. He or she will agree that Slovak society has indeed undergone a process of development since the beginning of the twentieth century that can be labelled as success. But the pessimist will also point out that all the hidden weaknesses of Slovak society surface when it is confronted with the opportunity for continuous and cumulative development; that every success has its flipside and that development was not only a problem-solving mechanism, but also a creator and instigator of problems. Many of the solutions chosen by the Slovak political elites brought more problems than solutions.

This definitely applies to the decisions determining the direction of development after 1989 and 1993. Four political establishments took turns in this era. Under the direction of the first, in power from 1989 to 1992, “real socialism” was disassembled. The second, in power from 1992 to 1998, banked on solving the statehood question and decided to dissolve Czechoslovakia. The third was occupied with guiding Slovakia’s integration into the EU and Nato. The fourth came to power in 2006 with the promise to consolidate society. No matter how different these four establishments have been in their moral or political qualities, their successes and failures have been subordinated to the same mechanism. Success has come from an ability to clearly identify what the public considered at the time to be key problem. Failure has been caused by the fact that the solutions offered were never accepted by a decisive majority of the public.

The first establishment lost its influence when the clash between the slogans of the “Velvet Revolution” and of the “real capitalism” became intolerable. The establishment of the 1992-1998 period was the most controversial. It limited the transformation of the economic system merely to privatization. The creation of the new state appeared as a pure façade behind which masked a rampant giveaway of state property to loyalists. The establishment of 1998-2006 successfully accomplished the integration into the Nato and EU. However it compromised itself by “stealing” renegades from the opposition parties in order to form parliamentary majorities. The controversial privatization of key industries, first and foremost the energy industry, did not make it any more popular. Time will tell how long the fourth establishment will remain in power. It got there in 2006 and it maintains unusually high levels of popular support. In any case, the global economic crisis has offered it a chance to explain away any of its failures.

A desensitized public

The relationship of Slovak society towards itself – its internal cultural, and social differentiation – is a key problem. The concept of “caring for the whole” is notably weaker in Slovak society than in neighbouring societies: Czech, Hungarian or Polish. We have a much more lax relationship towards ourselves, we are more tolerant of our own shortcomings. A “critical mass” that would spontaneously follow innovations or create a collective will to increase the quality of the relationship with ourselves is not to be taken for granted in any sphere of social life. Warnings about social passivity and a weakened sense of responsibility aim not to be an expression of nationalistic masochism. Their purpose is to draw attention to the real state of the Slovak society, whose integrity and ability to react adequately to today’s challenges was and still is weakened by unproductive political squabbles that have carried over to all spheres of life after 1989. All political parties opted for staging a “state of emergency” after 1989, a unique situation where “everything was at stake”. This resulted in political anaesthesia, a desensitization of the public and a lack of interest in the public domain.

Slovak society faces a task of spiritual consolidation. It is a problem that is likely to be more important than the that of a functioning economic or political system.

Seeking the crystallization point

We have to ask ourselves explicitly what the crystallization point of a spiritual consolidation could be. The idea of a nation? Of Christianity? A new Enlightenment? Would this not mean a “return” to national values in such shape and form as were meaningful in the nineteenth century? The power of Christianity to integrate is also doubtful. It is necessary, however, to ask how to establish or renew a relationship towards tradition. If we do not, our attempts will be counterproductive and we will damage more than we will fix.

The carrot and stick approach is not the solution in the sceptical society of our times. In the current situation, it is important to redefine the role of the state towards society. We need a clear knowledge of the potential of the state – of what the state can and cannot do in an era when the form of what is traditionally called “society” is shifting radically.

Traditionally, society was seen as a whole, an “organic whole” to which individuals are bound first and foremost by a certain loyalty. This sense of belonging served as the foundation for centripetal forces that were stronger than centrifugal forces. It was always possible to differentiate between the centre and periphery, to have an overview of the links between individual parts of the whole, to understand the mechanism of reproductive processes, to know where the seedbeds of innovation lay and how political and cultural hierarchies came about. Politics was about the interests of individual groups and about the growth of the whole, about building up cohesion and solidarity, about the responsibility of the elites towards “their” groups and towards the whole. This was underpinned by the idea that “we” are connected not only through pragmatic ties and mutual utility, but also by common values, a common past and a common future. The nation was a “community of fate”. From sociology to economics, the social sciences were about discovering how this whole – this “society” – functions, how it is structured, how it develops, and in some cases, why it ceases to exist.

Today this whole has become blurred. The boundaries between societies are becoming porous; the idea of belonging to a nation is gradually losing its power. Today, when someone says “we”, we cannot tell what is meant exactly. In blurred societies, internal differentiation is growing. But consciousness of differentiation is transformed by the media, and the interests of individual groups are more difficult to identify. Society is changing into a complex of overlapping networks; the role of the centre is diminishing; the sense of belonging to “social groups”, “classes” or a “nation” is weakening, or rather fragmenting, and along with it the sense of belonging to a certain whole. Society, if we can speak of such a thing, is kept together more by political and institutional means than by spontaneously exhibited loyalties from within.

None of these processes is fatal. It is possible to be dragged along by them and it is possible to resist. Every time we take a position on them, we do so on the basis of some ideology. Both responses can either restrict or allow new possibilities of development and at the same time put limitations upon governments and political parties.

Visions of the future

Whether we realize it or not, a vision of the future is always present in our actions and influences our decisions, most of our actions achieve more or less clearly defined goals or avoid threats that we see coming. Therefore we always work with certain variations, scenarios of action, often only intuitively. This “readiness” for future opportunities has a special place in politics. To a large extent, politics is work oriented towards the future; it is not only the art of the possible, but also the play of possibilities. Today Slovak society is once again confronted with the question of its own identity. It has to ask how centripetal and centrifugal forces operate within it, how the sense of belonging to supra-individual entities can be formed, and how opportunities for adapting to ongoing changes can be created.

Nobody is providing answers to these questions in Slovakia today. The political parties are buried in their petty wars, the academic sphere has withdrawn into its apolitical shell and the public is disgusted by the ruthlessness and shortsightedness of politicians. Perhaps it is a Slovak paradox: out of the conflict of negatives comes something positive in the end.

Taken from a special English language edition of Res Publica Nowa, published with the support of the International Visegrad Fund