After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Clifford Geertz predicted that the world would be characterized by ‘deep diversity’, ‘a sense of dispersion, of particularity, of complexity and of uncenteredness’ rather than unified world order, as stipulated by the then consensus.
In an age of identity politics and culture wars, Geertz’s insights sound even more powerful today than they did at the time. According to the American anthropologist, our task is ‘to penetrate the dazzle of the new heterogeneity’ and analyse the paradox that confronts us: the world is both more global and more divided than ever in human history. The sense that we find ourselves in ‘a scramble of differences in a field of connection’ is even more immediate, as is the realization that there is a multiplicity of alternative, sometimes conflicting and clashing, visions of the good.
This focal point, inspired by a lecture that Geertz delivered in 1995 at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, summarized in the institute’s magazine, will engage with these issues. It follows the launch of a research programme of the same name at the institute in January 2023, coordinated by Clemena Antonova.
The collection of essays is an extension of earlier focal points ‘Eurasia in Global Dialogue’ (2018-2023, led by Clemena Antonova) and ‘Russia in Global Dialogue’ (2012-2018, led by Tatiana Zhurzhenko). Further texts have been contributed by journals in the Eurozine network.
In collaboration with
The decline of Gayropa?
How Russia intends to save the world
As the winter Olympics opened in Sochi amid controversy over Russia’s anti-gay laws, Tatiana Riabova and Oleg Riabov showed how official discourse in Russia brands “European sexual deviancy” a natural result of western democratic development; and Russia as the last bastion of “normalcy”.
A surge of state violence and the subsequent curtailment of citizens’ right to protest, combined with an expansion of the authorities’ right to use force: Kirill Rogov reveals how the “Putin doctrine” previously applied to protests in Russia brought Ukraine to the brink of civil war.
Russia Inc.
The new realities of the Russian state
Europe should prepare itself for long-term cooperation with the energy-rich kleptocracy that has developed on its eastern borders. Because, given that the personal enrichment of politicians is part of the very foundation of the regime, Russia’s ruling political elite is not about to change any time soon.
Under cover
The emergence of Russia's new foreign policy
That Russia will never be a superpower as the USSR once was leaves it searching for a new international identity. Fyodor Lukyanov argues that Moscow’s policy today is a skilful imitation of striving for global status, intended to conceal the narrowing of the sphere of its immediate interests.
Reconfiguring power
The permanent election campaign
Ever since the outburst of protests and political discontent around the December 2011 elections in Russia, the country seems to be on the verge of change. But what kind of change? Will civic unrest, which persists with a varying, but hardly increasing intensity, bring about democratization, or will it induce Putin to introduce measures that strengthen his control? Russian political analyst Nikolay Petrov presents his reading of recent developments.
Colonizing oneself
Imperial puzzles for the twenty-first century
The IWM series “Books in perspective” presents publications related to the Institute’s research fields to the local academic community. Authors are invited to discuss their ideas with the audience. On 22 May 2012, Russian literary scholar Alexander Etkind talked about his recent work Internal Colonization. Russia’s Imperial Experience (Polity, 2011). Here, he explains why he wrote this book.
The Stalinist order, the Putinist order
Private life, political change and property in Russian society
The “Stalinist order” continues to lurk in aesthetic forms and written documents; from an architectural perspective, it lives on as long as the buildings survive. And merges with the new order, in which the new “elite” buy up the same buildings and imitative newbuilds for artificially inflated prices.
Peter Pomerantsev enters the matrix of managed democracy that underpins postmodern dictatorship in Russia. A society of pure spectacle, with fake parties, fake opposition, fake scandals and fake action: this is the political technologists’ project, in which (almost) everything becomes PR.
1812 in Russland und Europa
Inszenierung, Mythen, Analyse
Der Russlandfeldzug, zu dem die Grande Armée im Juni 1812 aufbrach, markiert in der politischen, sozialen und kulturellen Geschichte Europas eine Zäsur. Wenige Monate später war Moskau niedergebrannt. Napoleons Armee zerfiel auf dem Rückzug, das Russische Reich stieg zum “Retter Europas” auf. Diese Kriegsereignisse führten vor 200 Jahren zu einer Neuordnung Europas. Sie ging mit innergesellschaftlichen Veränderungen einher, beschleunigte die nationale Selbstfindung und wurde zu einem Gegenstand der Erinnerungsarbeit.
The interaction between the legal-rational and neo-patrimonial state provides the key to interpreting developments in post-communist Russia, argues Richard Sakwa. This tension precludes assigning Russia simply to the camp of authoritarian states, but it also means that Russia’s democracy is flawed.
Marina Akhmedova spent four days in the company of drug users in Yekaterinburg, central Russia, and was met with a picture of desperation, punctured by love, humanity and misplaced hope. Shortly after it was published, this harrowing piece of reportage journalism was banned in Russia.
Can Russia be modernized?
Problems, causes, opportunities
Plans to modernize Russia’s economy are resisted by bureaucracies benefiting from the country’s status as natural resource appendage of the developed world. That dependency on energy exports hinders political and economic progress is certain: but is high-tech the solution?
Blatantly rigged elections are the easiest way for the Putin regime to mimic the authoritarian power it does not possess. December’s protests destroyed Putin’s reputation of being in control; even genuinely competitive elections would be unable to restore his legitimacy.
Russia’s democratic inertia results from the dominance of private over universal values, writes writes Samuel A. Greene. But what are the factors that could lead to change? While pressure from below is likely to provoke consolidation of the elites, long-term economic decline might encourage greater European integration and reform of the country’s institutions.
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