Czechs dreams, Czech doubts

Czech political thinking about a united and democratic Europe has its milestones and its contexts. When the dissident and recent political prisoner Jiri Dienstbier put his ideas about European reunification together as Dreaming About Europe in 1986, he hardly suspected that in three years time he was to become the one to turn the dream into reality in his capacity as Czechoslovak foreign minister. A decade earlier, Milan Kundera the famous Czech writer living in exile, gave, in his definition of the role of central Europe, new impulses to the western diplomacy towards the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Czech intellectuals attentively listened to important western opinion-makers, such as Jacques Rupnik (The Other Europe) and Timothy Garton Ash (We The People), and found their deliberations relevant. On the threshold of a new era, Czech society was ready to destroy the old pattern of a European division. After November 1989, courageous visions mushroomed and serious plans mixed with wishful thinking.

Premature expectations

Things seemed simple at least for the first six months of 1990: Back to Europe read the spontaneous battlecry of those days and nobody disputed it. Europe meant Western Europe, Western values. Prague is after all located more westwards than Vienna, triumphed Czechs still imbibed by the collective euphoria. Actually, they might have felt frustrated by the fact that Austrians, close neighbours and almost relatives, despite having been defeated twice in wars, could peacefully proceed from catastrophes towards the luxuries of the modern welfare state. In spite such emotions however, few local politicians doubted the countrys’ rapid rapprochement to the economic and political structures of democratic Europe.

Trying Visegrad

The first post-revolutionary political leaders in the region were mostly former dissidents. This made them more open towards mutual understanding than would have been possible among professional politicians. A nice and uncomplicated regional cooperation and coordination initiative resulted. The Visegrad group – Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (which after 1 January 1993 split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia) has left aside other similar projects like the Central European Initiative or Pentagonal and has proved to be vital enough to secure for its members the best relations between their states in history, if nothing else. The annual presidential summit tradition founded by Arpad Goncz, Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa (they met for the first time at Visegrad castle in Hungary) was suitably supported by regular meetings of ministers debating technical issues. The accompanying rhetoric suggested that there would be better chances in the EU accession process if the ability to collaborate on a regional level with naturally and historically interconnected neighbours could be demonstrated. It was a strong leading idea, nevertheless the project never worked fully, if at all. Firstly because the societies this time did not share the idealism of their otherwise beloved leaders. Mutual negative stereotypes proved to be deep-rooted. Secondly, more pragmatic politicians such as Vaclav Klaus preferred more wealthy regional allies such as Germany and Austria. Klaus as an economist never believed in purely political formations and was in favour of CEFTA rather than Visegrad. What Visegrad founders feared became reality. Instead of following common strategies, their countries on their way to the European integration competed in a not very attractive horse-race. They were lobbying separately in Brussels; (Poles and Hungarians using the network of their west-based compatriots) and did not coordinate their efforts. The Czech government of Prime Minister Klaus seemed to neglect the diplomatic process altogether: While the Polish embassy at the European Commission employed up to forty officials, the Czech one had only six or seven for exactly the same agenda. The explanation that Poland is a much larger country was a childish one.

New identities

By 1992 Central and Eastern Europe lived through two contradictory experiences: on the one hand the prospect of an international integration, on the other, disintegration, the Hydra of different nationalisms and the unfortunate outburst of violence in Yugoslavia.

Logically, even those nations, who never have succeeded in building their own statehood, tended to grab their last chance. Thus the Slovak Prime Minister, when still within the federation with Czechs claimed for his compatriots “their own little star” twinkling on the future European flag. Pro-federal forces on both sides always believed that an early EU-membership would have made deconstruction of the common state impossible and useless, but there was no promise of an early entry. The perhaps exaggerated expectations generously watered down by European leaders coming to Prague and Bratislava two years earlier simply were not met.

Czechs were meanwhile trying to install themselves in a smaller flat after the discrete divorce from the Slovaks and to assume the new identity they neither longed nor struggled for. Unlike in Slovakia, there was practically no accentuated nationalism in the Czech society and ideologists volunteering for the independent Czech Republic had troubles in inventing new symbols and new myths, as well as in seeking out the attractive sides of the separation. One of the less happy attempts has informed the population that from a psychological point of view, the Czech Republic has moved a big step to the West. Nevertheless, both politicians and public opinion knew that now more than ever European integration is a must for a country suddenly shrinking down from fifteen million to ten, next to the German giant, and they soon begun to realize that it is not going to be a short-term task. A trace of deception might be found in the late membership application date – January 1996, almost two years after Hungary and Poland.

Priority Shift

What the Czech Republic expected most from the European integration was not (as in the case of some other candidate countries and of member states with the exception of Finland) primarily economic benefits, such as a better standard of living standard and access to the large common market, but also a security shelter and the need to integrate.

Pragmatic issues like geopolitics soon started to damage fine-sounding slogans about coming home to Europe in the early nineties, especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. With the Warsaw Pact dissolved, the Soviet Army was forced to leave the territory and Central Europe almost immediately perceived the potential danger of the strategic vacuum. Czechoslovak and later Czech politicians still dreamt about joining NATO in some distant future, but no one expected it may come earlier than EU membership. Henry Kissinger, when visiting Prague in 1997, gave no hope for an early NATO entry. Two years later, three Visegrad countries, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic became full members of the North Atlantic Alliance, just a week before the Kosovo operation. EU membership had lost part of its sex appeal for Czechs. Besides, they were going to be asked politely to hold on for another four years.

Stereotypes

What is the main obstacle in communicating EU membership advantages to “the man or woman in the street”? The Czech Republic has the privilege of having at its disposal the skills of the long-serving negotiator with Brussels, Mr Telicka, now the country’s ambassador at the European Commission, an excellent diplomat and a model civil servant. When invited to present his report in the framework of a public hearing on European integration organized by the upper chamber of the Czech Parliament, he did so. It was not the facts, but the language of his presentation which prompted even the Chair, the President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, to ask Mr. Telicka to speak in his mother tongue: his report was too technical, too full of European Commission jargon, to be properly understood by his fellow countrymen.

Roughly the same problem applies to some EC officials and experts and even to journalists. In the end, they are capable – full of knowledge and good intention – only to communicate with those who are already convinced. The poorer the relevant Euro-information, the larger the space for populists who are calling on Czech negotiators in Brussels “to fight for national interests” and for all those who push in the media the artificial polarization “us” vs. “them” (i. e. “the proud nation” vs. “Eurocrats”).
National pride is one part of the Czech self-image, another is the belief in being the object of eternal victimization. Czechs are ice-hockey champions, but perhaps as good in self-pity and complaining – to introduce another example of sometimes amusing form of stereotyping. Generalizations of the same less or more innocent type are common in media and among politicians. No wonder they penetrate easily into public opinion: in the same way, the image of the European Union was built up among Czechs. It started with rumours about banana or cucumber specifications to crystallize the picture of an all-mighty, non-elected Brussels bureaucracy, a cult communicating in a secret language with the intention of cheating everyone else. Populists of all colours keep recycling similar negative stereotypes.

Society: conservative and curious

If there is no such thing as a serious psychological profile of a nation, there are statistics, which reveal useful things. They show that Czechs are used to balancing extremes, and are surprisingly serious and responsible if necessary. By 2000, they did not believe they were sufficiently prepared to join the EU according to the Eurobarometer opinion poll, while Poles and Hungarians were displaying more bravado.

Czech society is quite conservative but curious at the same time: Czechs travel a lot and even farmers go for holiday to Greece or to Italy, but not for work. Older generations show more fear of changes, fear of the unknown, fear of “foreigners buying up our country”, and the EU respected that and gave Czechs their transition periods, limiting sales of land and houses to other EU citizens. Borders were closed for almost half a century, hence there is some amount of xenophobia, which does not necessarily equal racism. Very low social mobility is characteristic of the Czech society – most families live in the same houses for generations, working within a 20 kilometre radius all their life. A newly built plant in northern Moravia (the region with the highest unemployment rate) had problems in attracting enough workers – people were not willing to follow their job too far and the plant had to import a Polish labour force. That is why Austrian and German worries about cheap labour flooding their market after the enlargement are groundless, at least for the Czech Republic.

Some Czechs – students, young professionals and experts – actually are Europeans already. Czech businessmen, artists, software designers, diplomats enjoy a sort of “individual EU membership” when working and studying in European capitals. Those who really want to try how it feels to work abroad, can do so. Young Czech and Slovak individuals are employed in assistant positions even in the headquarters of the Commission. For all of them the key to the European door is plain and simple: language skills, open-mindedness and personal dedication.

A real Euro-realism?

When the results of the Central and East European Eurobarometer opinion poll were published in the mid-nineties, the figures for the Czech Republic were not especially encouraging. The EU image among the population did not improve since 1990 – on the contrary. While Polish EU supporters were in a comfortable majority all the time, only 34 per cent of Czechs voiced positive attitudes (49 per cent in 1990) and 40 per cent neutral ones. The very low level of anti-European responses – a mere 6 per cent – was definitely good however. The head of the European Commission Delegation in Prague at that time argued – slightly nervously – that the degree of reserve Czechs demonstrated was a sign of a natural scepticism typical of a highly educated, mature society, which was only asking for more specific and down to earth information. He was partly right. Czechs have a strong sense of everyday reality. Countries like Albania or Georgia scored highest in Euro-optimism in the past, only to become upset and confused some months later, as a result of dramatic domestic crises.

However, the figures did not change much during the coming years. Neither the Czech political class nor EU representatives, neither their words nor deeds have been able to alter substantially what was beginning to look like a fixed collective mind set. Yes, there were minor opinion shifts, but after a decade, Czechs have basically stuck to their initial positions: 43 per cent for the EU, 14 per cent against, 28 per cent neutral (Eurobarometer 2002). The same trends are reflected in all domestic opinion polls, and experts agree that the final distribution would depend on the EU entry referendum turn-out. The results have actually faithfully followed the opinion polls predictions: no-voters were represented mainly by the traditionally disciplined communist electorate, and the undecided ones did not make any last-minute decision to participate. The government had feared that also an important part of “pro-Europeans” might abstain but this was not the case. More than 77 per cent voted “yes” and with the 55 per cent turn-out this equals the expected 43 per cent of the electorate. What is still unique and advantageous for politicians promoting the integration, is the total absence of any hard-line anti-European currents. Not a single democratic political party plays that tune, all having European integration firmly placed in their programs. Czech leaders have hitherto shared a largely consensual, however somewhat lukewarm view on the EU enlargement with the rest of the society.

Not the right man

In no way does this indicate a lack of criticism or scepticism about Europe among Czechs. Vaclav Klaus, when still Prime Minister and President of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) was notorious for his Euro-scepticism. An excellent strategist, he was building his Euro-sceptical image to distinguish himself from other political leaders. Being a good realist, he was always sure that the country has no alternative; but within the party genuine anti-European fighting cocks still can be observed. While ODS officially recommended its voters to support the entry, one of the Vice-Presidents of the party publicly announced his “no” while others tend to a sort of “yes, but…”. The official watchword for the campaign reads: “If to join the EU, then with the ODS”. The greatest paradox is that ODS has the most pro-European electorate when compared with other political parties: university educated people, entrepreneurs, independent, dynamic, highly mobile individuals who consider themselves successful. Klaus has been criticising the EU only too often and has been right from time to time. In the larger political context nevertheless, he was not, so to speak, the right man to be right, because he instrumentalized his domestic audience, pretending to defend national interests. He was not used to unify the society but to polarize it. In the future it may turn out to be the weak point in his presidency.

Czech political chess-board

The Czech Republic owes a lot to the international reputation of its first president Vaclav Havel. His last term in office expired in February 2003 and he may now influence Czech politics as independent and critical observer. He is and always has been a great supporter of EU-entry.

The current coalition cabinet seems to have reflected all comments and recommendations coming from the Commission and the socialist Prime Minister Spidla as well as his predecessor Zeman who travelled a lot lobbying for their country among European counterparts.
The remaining governmental parties are entirely pro-European and even the Christian Democrats, traditionally representing farmers, can breathe freely: Czech agriculture is pretty efficient and employs just a tiny percentage of the population. Liberals (The Union of Freedom) are courageous enough to sport their European profile on every occasion.

Czech communists, long years in the opposition, represent a specific case: in the beginning, they seemed to support the integration, looking for the Social Charter as a hammer against possible capitalist excesses, but eventually they have withdrawn and have suggested to their followers to vote against.

Interests and the interested

Since there are no important segments of the society likely to suffer by joining the Union, no legitimate anti-European interests are politically articulated. Less legitimate interests are in danger now. Whose interest was served by the chaos in customs, in taxes, in banking, which allowed for manipulations with light fuels and petrol, money-laundering, draining capital from state-owned companies away to the Caribbean Islands? It was both local and international organized crime, listening to the heavenly music of Czech Thatcherists, comforting the disturbed public opinion with lullabies about the healing forces of the free market. Certainly, such interest groups will be determined to undermine the integration process or to slow it down.

Czechs fear crime most of all socially malign factors, and are almost hopeless when facing corruption. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index placed the Czech Republic in the 25 position in 1996, somewhere between Belgium and Italy, but since then, a steep decline is noticeable. For this reason, Czechs are so sensitive about every proof of Western European officials being corrupted, too. They are used to reading about never ending scandals of their own greedy politicians; people like the former Socialist Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Kavan (still presiding over the General Assembly of the United Nations) who lost forever all credibility. But the affair of the Delors’ Commission has dramatically damaged the image of the whole Union, giving fresh momentum to superstitions about the EU as an insane giant social engineering project, a socialist deviation relict, a den of vice and hypocrisy and so on. One must argue against this on a factual level, be patient enough to explain that rumours about the EU outlawing traditional Czech delicacies, such as Olomouc region cheese or Moravian plum brandy, are groundless. However, we all remember how dangerous irrationality and ignorance combined with the language of symbols can be: e.g. the second Norwegian referendum about entering the EU was lost due the irrational fear of a small fragment of voters that they would lose their national flag. No explanatory campaign is useless, but there are moments when the convincing force of rational arguments fades, at least for a while.

Decent opponents

There are, of course, serious and sincere doubts, too. Their source may be a few drops of bitterness: The waiting period was too long, some EC decisions seemed arbitrary, sometimes not very transparent, and seemed the result of political bargaining rather than the vision of great minds. No wonder that the less pessimistic speak about a marriage of convenience, and the less optimistic concentrate on all the “yes-ifs” and “yes-buts”.

Good taste makes a difference between more pronounced anti-European streams. The young conservatives are moderate in their language use and fair in their polemics. You can expect neither from the militant nationalistic margin.
Some sceptics fear floods of immigrants once the Czech Republic joins the EU. They ignore that they are already here – both legal and illegal immigration has gradually transformed the Czech Republic and has turned a transit country into a destination country.

Good Reasons Why

The EU supporters are better prepared to argue why they wish to integrate into the largest international democratic project in history. Their sociologal profile is the exact opposite of those who fear the Union and the indifferent ones. Most opponents have no ideological arguments. Typically, they have reached just a lower education, are unskilled, feel insecure, fear the unknown and the foreign, refuse any kind of change and always did. The unconcerned would reply: “I don’t speak languages, I don’t intend to travel or work abroad, so I don’t care”. Pro-Europeans are generally more educated, successful or at least content in their professions, active, open-minded, long-term planning – they would argue: “I am hardly going to profit on the EU membership personally, but I try to think about my children/my grandchildren”.

The campaign

The educational campaign before the Czech referendum was organized by the government, closely watched by suspecting journalists and politicians in the opposition, and was, justly or unjustly, often criticized. The government left criticism uncommented: all what mattered was the result, and after years of stagnation, the willingness of voters to take part in the referendum started to increase. Some media, such as the liberal daily paper Lidove noviny, have declared their support openly, others preferred to remain more detached and print pros and cons in a mirror layout. The key pillar of the campaign was advertising, including not only billboards, radio and TV spots, newspaper adds, but also quizzes and readers’ competitions for prizes.
A lot of invisible work was also done by non-governmental organizations, volunteers, pro-European clubs and civic associations.
Yet there were no spectacular events, no giant concerts. The organizers of a concert for Europe on the Old Town Square were not given permission from Prague Town Hall, still ruled by ODS majority – perhaps discouraged by the announced presence of ex-president Havel.

Non-parliamentary political parties could manifest their free imagination: The Greens invited Daniel Cohn-Bandit, Member of the European Parliament, European Democrats of the former Mayor of Prague Jan Kasl have enjoyed their privileged political self-definition.
Government coalition parties were somewhat trapped since Social- and Christian Democrats were not always sure about the opinion of their own members. The ODS was busy in finding ways how to express its reservations towards the EU referendum. The new leader of the strongest opposition party Topolanek dared to suggest that it might also be a referendum on the quality of the government. (The coalition disposes over the weakest possible majority of one voice in the Lower Chamber.)

Communists have disciplined the electorate and the Central Committee, when recommending the negative vote. They did not follow any ideological reasons, but rather the essential conservatism of its widely ageing comrades. The communist “no” successively made quite a few undetermined to vote “yes”.

Everybody was eager to know the position of president Klaus. He, formally a non-party figure, did not surprise: first he dismissed the campaign as provocatively superficial and called for a deep and substantial debate two weeks before referendum! Secondly, unlike his counterparts in Slovakia or Poland he did not ask the population of his country to vote “yes”. What he actually did, was recommending to participate in the vote.
In a reaction, the political commentator Jiri Pehe appropriately reminded the public that Czech politicians had at least a seven year period to explain themselves in time; their last minute complains were nothing than sheer hypocrisy.

According to one of the major opinion research agencies STEM, the amount of information on Europe was sufficient. The problem was its distribution. Public media tended to speak in a sophisticated way to the already convinced. Who needed to be informed were viewers of the dominant commercial TV Nova. Rumours emerged about a great trick, something on the edge of blackmail: Nova had to broadcast pro-European ads in exchange for a more benevolent view of its not fully transparent ownership.

The EU as such had a prominent player in Prague. The EU-delegation ambassador Ramiro Cibrian, Spanish Basque, became extremely popular by mastering the Czech language during his stay. He spoke to common people in tramways, schools, in villages and even in the municipal sewerage, lecturing the Czech authorities what they should do. He did not hesitate “to interfere into domestic affairs” whenever he found it necessary to do so, publishing highly critical articles about Czech officials’ indolence in the local press.

Money

Finances is – no surprise – a favourite theme of not only pub talks in the Czech Republic. The economical dimension of the European Union enlargement worried from the very beginning both citizens and politicians. The negotiations successfully closed in December in Copenhagen and were full of purely technical and financial agreements, calendars and schedules. The output was inevitably the work of a great compromise. Bad news: farmers cannot expect more than a third of payments their EU colleagues receive. Good news: the sum they are going to be paid makes them a privileged class in their country with an average wage of 500 Euro. Bad news: after May 1, 2004, V.A.T. for most services will jump from 5 per cent to the 22 per cent zone. Not the best timing for such legislative amendment just before the referendum. Good news: stronger Euro equals stronger Czech crown. Finally, best news and a very good argument: the total EU aid to the Czech Republic already paid has reached 46 billion Czech crowns (1,5 billion Euro).

A slow progress

The Czech Republic has not only accomplished ten years of its independent existence. but also ten years of approaching European and Euro-Atlantic structures, ten years of struggles, errors and humble victories. The first balance is not bad: more and more, Czech lands resemble any other normal, boring European democracy. Relations with Slovaks are better than ever. Even the relations between the Czechs and Germans are the best in history. The problem of the Sudeten Germans is not an issue in Berlin or Prague, but in Munich and in the hearts of some militant circles on the Czech side belonging to the old generation, which has suffered most during World War II. Sudeten Germans would like to negotiate and are looking for a partner but for obvious reasons it cannot be the Czech government. The Sudeten question is in many ways not a bilateral question anymore. The crimes committed by Czechs after the war in the outburst of a retaliation represent a uniquely Czech bad conscience. It is up to Czechs to cope with their own past, exactly as it was the case for Germans after the war to undergo denazification.

By the end of the nineties, certain Austrian politicians have displayed their unwillingness to share benefits of the EU membership with their less privileged neighbours and delivered some strongly worded statements. What did they mean? Partly, it could have been a syndrome of a newcomer to the train-compartment: he feels uncomfortable and becomes safer and fully accepted only when defining himself against the next newcomer. The other part of the message may be a mixture of misunderstanding, misinformation and a lack of mutual good will, all that filtered and amplified through media. But if you look at the Austrian opinion polls in detail (summary: Neues Volksblatt), you see that in March 2001 80 per cent of the Austrians believed that a common policy with other Central European neighbours within EU is possible, or at least worth trying.

Austrians believed that Hungary was best prepared for such partnership (87 per cent), the Czech Republic far behind (47 per cent). But if you examine Austrian short list of “favourite fears”, you see that it is topped by nuclear energy (86 per cent). Fear of new EU members dumping the labour force and causing unemployment ranks only third with 45 per cent. It means that the majority does not fear for their jobs; the nuclear power plant Temelin (and in some extent the Czech post-war decrees exiling Sudeten Germans, including Austrians) is responsible for the unfavourable public opinion about Czechs. In spite of all reserves, Austrians were not in principle against enlargement, but a slight majority (52 per cent) shared the view that enlargement will bring more disadvantages for Austria.

Czech politicians were not extremely helpful during the integration processes; similarly, every attempt to include the Czech Republic into the international security and humanitarian operations immediately became the object of narrow-minded domestic debates. Whenever on a mission, on the contrary, Czechs were doing well, hence their good prospects in NATO. They never let themselves to be pushed to accept anti-American positions; especially French diplomats in Prague never understood why. During all these years, Czechs were fighting their own inferiority complexes as well as the arrogance of some of their representatives (Vaclav Klaus has gained some reputation in Brussels: he behaved as if the EU was presenting its application to join the Czech Republic, and not vice versa, a high ranking official of the European Commission remarked). After all those years, Europe is not a romantic aspiration for Czechs, but rather solid common sense. Czech dreams are much sober now and Czech doubts much less fundamental. It is daylight, it is for real now. However, many Czechs remembering their country from a mere fourteen years ago, still find everything that is happening a miracle.